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The Claimant claimed disability discrimination by way of failure to make reasonable adjustments by the Chief Constable in that he: (1) did not (further) extend her probationary period to afford her as much time as she needed to recover from surgery and prove her fitness; and (2) did not slot her into a civilian staff role without competitive process.

(1) Further extension of probation:

- C was a probationer Constable who would have been successfully confirmed as a fully serving officer at the end of her probation, but for an incident on duty that exacerbated arthritis in her left knee (of which she had previously been unaware), and which caused her to be unable physically to pass her probation. It was accepted that she was disabled for the purposes of the DDA 1995.

- C first took sick leave due to her disability 3 months from the end of her probation and returned to work on restricted duties about a week before the end date.

- Extensions to her probation were granted, first for 6 months - to give her a chance to make the grade physically, then for a further 3 months - as there was continued uncertainty in the medical prognosis including talk of a possible second round of surgery (a partial knee replacement).

- Eventually, in May 2010, a case conference was held: The second operation was planned for 17th September 2010. It was not certain whether C would recover such as to be able to resume front-line duties post-operation. The best-case scenario was a return to full training in March 2011, with an estimated 3 months re-training needed thereafter - as, by March 2011, she would have been away from front-line duties for 20 months.

- Given the differing medical opinions and the lack of assurance from the more positive opinion, the cost of re-training her, the financial pressures on the Chief Constable (as evidenced before the Tribunal), the "great deal" that the Force had done already by way of adjustments for her, and the burden of paying her pension (if probation were to be extended) after what would be (on the medical evidence) a curtailed career as an officer (6-10 years service):

the Tribunal HELD that the refusal to further extend C's probationary period (for what would have been a further 12 months) was not a failure to make a reasonable adjustment.

(2) Slotting C into a civilian staff role:

- Although the outcome of the May 2010 case conference had been a recommendation by the District Commander that the Chief Constable dispense with C's services pursuant to Regulation 13 of the Police Regulations 2003, the decision was not finalised until August 2010.

- In the interim, efforts were made to find a vacancy for C in a civilian staff role, working for the Police Authority. (This process necessitated a further 2 month extension to her probation, which was granted.)

- C was invited to apply for 3 posts. She indicated an interest in one of them and was told that her application would be fast-tracked (i.e., although the application deadline had passed with one other having applied, the deadline would be extended exclusively for her). Ultimately, C did not apply even for that post.

- C argued that the Chief Constable had failed to make the 'reasonable adjustment' of slotting her into a civilian staff role without competitive interview, relying on Archibald v Fife Council (2004, House of Lords). She further argued that she should have been treated on the same footing as the 10 or so civilian staff members whom had 17 jobs ring-fenced for them (jobs for which C was not invited to apply).

The Tribunal HELD that

(i) The substantial disadvantage that any reasonable adjustment would be aimed at removing was that C could not complete her probation and so be confirmed in office as a permanent serving Police Constable. The position of Probationer Police Constables is a singular and vulnerable one. Their status is different from that of fully-qualified Constables, and different from that of civilian staff - whom are actually employees of the Police Authority (whereas Police Constables are office-holders for the Crown, but deemed to be employees for DDA purposes). Slotting C into a civilian staff role clearly could not remove the substantial disadvantage, as it would in fact prevent her confirmation as a Police Constable.

(ii) What C sought was not re-engagement in the strict sense, but employment for the first time by the Police Authority, which put her in a different position to the existing staff employees at risk of redundancy. This was not a reasonable option in this case for the Chief Constable, notwithstanding that the Chief Constable had made efforts and was willing to facilitate her applications for civilian staff posts. There was no vacancy for an unsuccessful probationer.

For these reasons, omitting to slot C into a civilian staff role without competitive process was not a failure to make a reasonable adjustment.

Accordingly, the Employment Tribunal unanimously found that the complaint of disability discrimination by way of failure to make reasonable adjustments was not well-founded and they made a declaration to that effect.

Although this is a first-instance decision, Police Employment practitioners may find it, and the principles that underpin the 'slotting' issue, of assistance when dealing with similar complaints by probationer Constables whom have been unsuccessful by reason of disability.