In 1997 Mr Seal was arrested in his mother’s house in Merthyr Tydfil for breach of the peace. The police took him outside and then removed him to St Tydfil’s hospital in accordance with section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1981, where he was held for 9 days.

Mr Seal brought a claim for, inter alia, misuse by the police of section 136 of the 1983 Act. Section 139(2) of the 1983 Act said that "no civil proceedings shall be brought against any person in any court in respect of any [act made under the 1983 Act] without the leave of the High Court." Mr Seal had not sought permission and his claim had been struck out by the County Court. He appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

The issue for the European Court of Human Rights was whether or not the requirement under the 1983 Act that a claimant acquire leave from the High Court prior to bringing his claim was contrary to Article 6 ECHR. There was a preliminary issue as to whether Mr Seal had exhausted his domestic remedies and so had a right to apply to the Strasbourg court. The court found that he had with regard to Article 6 but not with regard to Article 14 and so his application was admissible only with regard to Article 6.

The court found that the requirement to acquire leave from a High Court judge was in pursuance of a legitimate aim – namely, the protection of those exercising their powers under the 1983 Act. It was noted that the requirement to go to the High Court first was not a procedural bar but merely a quality control so as to only allow claims which were not vexatious or unmeritorious.

Mr Seal had had six years as per the Limitation Act 1980 to bring his claim and he did so with some four months to spare; the six-year limitation was not contrary to Article 6 (Stubbings and Others v UK (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 213). Mr Seal had obtained legal advice and had plenty of time to apply to the High Court for permission both before and after making his claim. As such, he was not deprived of the opportunity of a fair hearing. The court held that Mr Seal’s failure to obtain leave was entirely the fault of his own conduct and that of his solicitors. There was, therefore, no breach of the Convention.